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Abstract 
We investigated the impact of individuals who passed the Vietnamese imperial examinations 
(1075–1919) on the present-day quantity and quality of education in their home districts. We 
layered the 2009 Population and Housing Census and the 2009 National Entrance Exams to 
University (NEEU) test scores on the geographical distribution of imperial test takers’ home 
districts. We constructed a novel instrumental variable representing the average distance 
between the examinees’ home districts and the corresponding imperial examination venues. 
We found a persistent legacy in the average years of schooling, literacy rate, school attendance 
rate, NEEU test scores, and primary school dropout rate.  
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1. Introduction 
Some historical legacies have been advantageous for regional development while 
others have been disadvantageous (Nunn, 2020). The mechanisms include formal institutions 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001), geography, historical events, and informal institutions, that is, cultural 
norms, which Becker et al. (2016) specified as kinship, schooling, and social interactions. 
However, to our knowledge, literature on the economic rationale of informal institutional 
effects is scarce. 
A culture of learning and determination to learn may be an aspect of social interaction. 
For example, for centuries, a popular Dong Ho folk woodcut print that pays tribute to those 
who were awarded the highest rank in the imperial examinations (Vinh quy bái tổ in 
Vietnamese, and hereafter, “paying tribute”) has been purchased during the Vietnamese New 
Year holidays as a sign of luck. It is usually hung conspicuously indoors to motivate young 
family members to study hard and achieve academic success. Even 91 years after the last 
Vietnamese imperial examination, the theme still reverberates throughout Vietnamese society. 
In 2010, shortly after receiving the Fields Medal for proving the fundamental lemma for 
automorphic forms, Professor Ngô Bảo Châu, a Vietnamese-French mathematician, returned 
to his ancestral cemetery in Ba Dinh district, Hanoi to worship, report his success, and pay 
tribute to his ancestor (Thuan Hoa, 2010).  
This study seeks empirical evidence of whether a culture of learning has passed from 
generation to generation in Vietnam and attempts to find the economic rationale behind the 
statistical results. Specifically, we investigate whether an association exists between the 
success of the test takers who passed the 1075–1919 imperial examinations at the national 
level1 (hereafter, “imperial elites”) and the educational achievements of people living in the 
district today that was home to these imperial elites. Our analysis examines educational 
outcomes at two levels, namely the district aggregated level (covering 687 districts2) and the 
individual level (covering about 0.68 million test takers born in 1991). In each district, we 
consider both the number of imperial elites and the density of imperial elites per square 
 
1 We refer to Kỳ thi Đại khoa (thi Hội) in Vietnamese as imperial examinations. Heavily influenced by the Chinese 
imperial examinations, the Vietnamese imperial examinations lasted 15 years longer. The examinations were used 
to select public officials to work in the imperial government, either at the central or the local level. The written 
examinations were conducted using mainly Chinese characters. See Appendix 1 for further details. 
2 There were 689 districts in the 2009 Population and Housing Census (100% version). 
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kilometer (as an alternative). We apply an instrumental variable (IV) approach for our analysis 
of both levels.  
Our study is also motivated by voids in the literature and specific facts. First, to our 
knowledge, empirical evidence of a persistent culture of learning in Vietnam remains scant. 
Second, to pass the imperial examinations, candidates had to devote their efforts to mastering 
Confucian literature, which likely precluded them from learning the latest information, 
technology, and scientific discoveries from the West. Squicciarini and Voigtländer (2015) 
showed that such “upper-tail knowledge” increased productivity and innovation during the 
Industrial Revolution. Nevertheless, developing the work ethic necessary to attain elite status 
in society may have conferred advantages on the examinee’s descendants. 
Third, to what degree the culture of learning affected people is unclear. After the 
abolition of the Chinese imperial examination system, in which the quota on the number of 
people eligible to take the imperial examination was high, more Chinese went abroad to study 
(Bai, 2019). But it is unclear what effect this had on the majority of people who were not able 
to go abroad.  
Fourth, a unique historical fact allows us to identify a culture of learning from the 
transfer of knowledge via written language. The contemporary Roman-based Vietnamese 
script3  (Quốc ngữ in Vietnamese) completely replaced Chinese characters as the official 
written language in the 1910s. Valencia (2019) identified a channel of knowledge transfer via 
written language when examining Jesuit missions in 1609 in South America. This channel of 
transmission can also explain the findings of Chen et al. (2020), who showed that the 
population density of Chinese imperial elites (1368–1905) was associated with more years of 
schooling in 278 present-day prefectural residents. It is therefore possible that knowledge of 
logograph-based Chinese characters and literature boosted the next generation’s education via 
kinship.  
Fifth, as shown in Figure 1 in Alesina and Giuliano (2015), Vietnam’s cultural values 
differ from those of China. Compared with China, Vietnam places greater importance on 
family ties and work ethic than luck and connections4. If these cultural values are persistent, 
we might expect a stronger intergenerational transfer of human capital and work ethic. 
However, the removal of Chinese characters from written Vietnamese affords us the 
 
3 The Vietnamese alphabet was invented by Alexandre de Rhodes, an Avignonese Jesuit missionary, in 1651 and 
is derived from the Portuguese alphabet. 
4 Respondents had two choices: a. “In the long-run, hard work usually brings a better life”; and b. “Hard work 
does not generally bring success; it is more a matter of luck and connections” (Alesina and Giuliano, 2015).  
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opportunity to examine the main channel through which the learning culture is shared. In 
addition, the negative correlation between family ties and individualism (Alesina and Giuliano, 
2015) suggests that stronger family ties lead to slower national development (Gorodnichenko 
and Roland, 2017) and perhaps even weaker development of human capital. Moreover, a 
stronger work ethic may indicate that the imperial examinations were relatively fair, and that 
the success of people today is more likely due to their own hard work. 
Our findings indicate a persistent relationship between the success of imperial elites 
and the quantity and quality of present-day education. More specifically, we find that the 
number and density of imperial elites in the past in a given district is associated with a higher 
literacy rate, school attendance rate in compulsory primary school and twelfth grade, more 
average years of schooling, and a higher probability of taking the National Entrance 
Examinations to University (NEEU) in the present day. In contrast, the correlations were 
negative when the outcomes were rates for primary school dropouts and school non-
enrollment. From the analysis at the individual level, we find that the number and density of 
imperial elites in the district led to higher age-standardized test scores (z-scores) in the NEEU 
regardless of the test subjects. Higher z-scores might also be a reason for a higher school 
attendance rate among the district population aged 18–24 years. We propose several 
hypotheses for this persistent legacy, such as the independence of villages from central power, 
heavy reliance on academic decree payrolls, especially for university degrees, and favoritism 
toward districts in which a bureaucrat or politician was born. These might be among the 
important factors contributing to the culture of learning and determination to this day.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to our knowledge, this 
paper is the first to examine the connection between a culture of learning and a qualitive 
measurement of present-day education. Second, we proved the existence of a learning culture 
by examining various educational outcomes: literacy rate, school attendance rate, school 
dropout rate, and school non-enrollment rate. Third, we contribute a novel IV calculating the 
average distance from each district to the corresponding capital where the national-level 
imperial examination was administered.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the data sources and 
how we integrate the data for analysis in Section 2. Section 3 presents our identification 
strategy, the construction of the IV, and the methods. We report the results and discuss possible 
mechanisms behind the results in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusion and 
notes our research limitations. 
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2. Data 
Our analyses are based on several important historical and contemporary data sources. 
Combining these with geographical data, we laid the historical data on the contemporary data 
by using identical concordance district names to construct a dataset of 687 identical districts. 
2.1 Historical data 
We extracted information from Ngo (2006), who collated the longest known list of 
imperial elites who passed the national level of the 1075–1919 imperial examinations (see 
Appendix 1 for description) from many ancient sources (mainly the stela stones and the 
imperial examination records [Đăng Khoa Lục in Vietnamese]) and furthermore noted the 
home of each imperial elite and the corresponding district as it is known today.  
We obtained a list of 2,888 names5 and home districts of imperial elites from the more 
than 180 recorded imperial examinations in Vietnam. However, we could only obtain up-to-
date concordance geographical locations at the district level for 2,844 imperial elites (covering 
198 districts6). We counted the number of imperial elites in the list for each district to create 
our main variable, !"#$!	&'()!* , as well as the density of the imperial elites per square 
kilometer, !"#$!	+!&,#$-. The number of imperial elites per time period is shown in Appendix 
2 and Graph 1, and their distribution by geography is shown in Appendix 5.  
[Insert Graph 1 here] 
2.2 Contemporary data 
2.2.1 Quantity of education 
We relied on the 2009 Vietnamese Population and Housing Census (100% or 86.9 
million observations—hereafter, “population census”) conducted by the General Statistics 
Office of Vietnam (GSO). The population census recorded whether individuals could read and 
write. We investigated the variable "#$!*./-	*.$! among those aged ≥7 years in the district 
population. The census also included a question on school attendance status (as of April 1, 
 
5 Ngo (2006) originally listed 2,894 names of imperial elites. However, we found a few duplications because some 
test takers took the test several times to improve their score and obtain the highest rank. 
6 In the 2009 population census, Vietnamese administrative divisions comprised 63 provinces (Level 1) and 689 
districts (Level 2).  
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2009, which is within the school calendar), which measured our second variable, 
.$$!&+.&/!	*.$!. The census asked if the individual had ever attended school and whether, 
at the time of the census, they were still attending school. This information helped us to create 
a third variable for school dropout, +*010'$	*.$! . If the individual had completed their 
education, the information on the highest grade or educational level attained by the individual 
was recorded. This measured our converted years of schooling for each individual as the fourth 
variable, for which we considered the age cohorts (18+, 22+, and 25+) most likely to have 
completed their education.  
Furthermore, we calculated several outcomes by age cohort at the district level. If the 
individual had never attended school, we had a corresponding dummy variable, named 
&!2!*	!&*0"", and calculated the &!2!*	!&*0"" rate by dividing the total number of those who 
had never attended school in any age cohort by the district population of the same age cohort. 
We considered .$$!&+.&/!	*.$!, +*010'$	*.$!, and the &!2!*	!&*0""  rate at the district 
level for compulsory education (primary school) in the 7–10 age cohort. Primary school is 
important because everyone has to graduate before pursuing higher education later in life. In 
addition, we considered school .$$!&+.&/!	*.$!  in 2009 for individuals born in 1991 in 
connection with the examinations to university in 2009.  
2.2.2 Quality of education 
To assess the quality of education, we examined the data of university placement test 
scores in 2009 (the NEEU). Each classification of the NEEU is administered by the Vietnamese 
Ministry of Education and Training (MoET) at exactly the same time and date, with the same 
test problems, and using a centralized anonymous scoring system. A census of NEEU 0.98 
million test takers recorded the test scores of individuals (Vu, 2019) according to 11 pre-
determined classifications. For decades, each classification of the NEEU comprised three pre-
determined test subjects. We considered the four main classifications, which represent 96% of 
all 2009 NEEU test takers: A (Mathematics, Physics, and Chemistry), B (Biology, 
Mathematics, and Chemistry), C (Literature, History, and Geography), and D (Literature, 
Mathematics, and Foreign language). The sum of the three scores (the total test score, hereafter) 
is used to determine university placement. Universities use the total test score in a given 
classification to place individuals according to a pre-determined (i.e., decided several months 
before the test dates) number of “seats” for a specific field of study. Each university pre-
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determined one or several test classifications for placements in its faculties and fields of 
studies7. 
The NEEU test scores, especially the Mathematics scores, best reflect the human capital 
and investment in quality of education. This is because test takers are expected to devote their 
best effort to all three subjects, which contain no pass/fail threshold. Scoring is anonymous and 
conducted at the national level. The passing score is determined after all the answer sheets have 
been scored and is subsequently announced nationwide. By then, universities have ranked test 
takers according to the sum of their three test scores. Placements are made, starting with the 
highest scores and proceeding downward until all the seats are filled. The entrance 
examinations for each classification are held only once in a year. In 2009, the examinations for 
classification A were held July 4–5, whereas those for B, C, and D were held July 9–10. It is 
thus practically impossible to take the examinations for more than two classifications. 
Accordingly, the majority of test takers self-select into a single classification as early as the 
tenth grade to have adequate time to prepare for their test. Not surprisingly, entrance 
examinations are extremely competitive. In 2009, the ratio of test takers to available seats 
ranged from 1:2 to 1:23 (Vu, 2019).  
Using the home districts declared by the NEEU test takers on their test application 
forms, we linked the test scores for classifications A, B, C, and D with the home districts of 
imperial elites. We considered only the test takers who were born in 1991 because they formed 
the highest number of test takers (73%). Also, those individuals likely took NEEU for the first 
time in their lives8. We used the three subject scores and the total scores as the fourth variable. 
More precisely, we used the standardized (3 − ,/0*!) test score for each classification as an 
outcome (hereafter, “z-score”) at the individual level. The descriptive statistics of each 
classification are provided in Appendix 4.  
The act of taking the NEEU presents a selection issue. We considered this selection in 
the probability of taking the NEEU after the twelfth grade ($.5#&6	7889	.:$!*	12$ℎ	6*.+!) 
at the district level by dividing the sum of identical test takers over the aggregated number of 
individuals who were born in 1991 and recorded as attending school as of April 1, 2009 in the 
population census.  
 
7 For example, a university might decide to use test scores in classification A to place students in the faculty of 
engineering with a specialty in mechanics. The university might also use classification B for another specialty, 
such as biotechnology. 
8 We chose individuals who graduated from high school in May 2009. 
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2.3 Geographical information system data as controls 
Based on Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013), we used geographical information system 
(GIS) data from several sources to create control variables at the district level. We used 2009 
nighttime light data (Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime Lights Time Series) from the US 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to construct average nighttime light 
intensity as a proxy for economic activity and development. We preferred the oldest 
geographical data because they best represent the past characteristics of the district. The 1992 
Global Land Cover Characterization from the United States Geological Survey Earth 
Resources Observation and Science Center (USGS EROS) was used to generate the 
urbanization land ratio and cropland ratio for each district. From the USGS EROS Center’s 
Landsat Imagery in 1996, we generated the average elevation for each district. We also 
calculated the distance from each present-day district center to the coastline (distance to coast) 
using the shape file provided by the Database of Global Administrative Areas9. 
Finally, we obtained a dataset on 687 districts and a dataset on individuals and their test 
scores for each classification with all the information necessary for our analysis (see Appendix 
3 and 4). 
3. Methods 
3.1 Identification strategy 
Unobservable factors could potentially result in endogeneity issues. For example, 
examinees needed several years to prepare for imperial examinations. To be eligible to take the 
national level examination one first had to pass the provincial examination. Upon passing the 
national level examination, imperial elites could be awarded positions even as high as top-
ranked public official in the imperial government (Ngo, 2006). It should be noted that the 
number of imperial elites in a given area was not random because public schools were not 
present in every district (Ngo, 2006); thus, lower-level administrations relied mainly on private 
schools funded by the local community (Ngo, 2006).  
To account for these unobservable factors, we implemented an IV (hereafter, 
interchangeably “.2!*.6!	+#,$.&/!” or “IV”) to represent the average distance from each 
 
9 Available at: www.gadm.org 
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district to each imperial examination test venue’s district for all imperial examinations during 
1075–1919. For each imperial examination year, we calculate the arc distance between the 
present-day center of each district to the district where the imperial examinations were actually 
held10. Based on Tran (1920), we decided the timeline of each dynasty and the corresponding 
capital, combining the information from Ngo (2006) to determine the imperial examination test 
venues, which were always where the concurrent emperor was living. This is because the 
emperor made the final decision on who passed the imperial examination and also interviewed 
the top-ranked candidates (Ngo, 2006). The distance, in kilometers, is a proxy for the cost of 
attending each imperial examination. We took the average of these distances for each district 
to form the IV.  
We argue that traveling this average distance was both important and substantially 
costly to the majority of people. This is because the territory of Vietnam had an S-shape, and 
was separated by high mountains and rivers between the north and the south. In addition, 
imperial examination test takers were required to arrive at the test venue several months in 
advance for preparation (Ngo, 2006).  
Our calculated IV is not directly related to the current cost of education for individuals 
today for several important reasons. First, the capital of Vietnam has changed several times 
throughout history, which was an exogenous factor for test takers. In addition, Vietnam has 
experienced multiple national divisions, and has had two or even three “capitals” concurrently. 
The emperor of each region held their own respective imperial examinations (Ngo, 2006). 
Ordinary citizens could move freely to take the tests under different emperors which were even 
in the same year (Ngo, 2006).  
Second, since 1075, the territory has almost doubled in size (see Appendix 5). 
Individuals living in South Vietnam today are not necessarily at a disadvantage. For example, 
the distance to imperial test venues conferred no advantage on individuals in Hue and Thanh 
Hoa compared with individuals in the south, especially those in the relatively better developed 
areas, such as Ho Chi Minh City. In 2009, Ho Chi Minh City had a population of 7.1 million 
people, 1.77 times higher than that of Hanoi, and was ranked number one in nighttime light 
 
10 We acknowledge the difference between contemporary district boundaries and the corresponding historical ones 
in each dynasty. However, we assume contemporary district boundaries as proximate common areas to the village 
from where the imperial elite originated. Each district has an area of 422 km2 on average, or a circle with a 12km 
radius. 
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intensity11. Thanh Hoa and Thua Thien Hue province are far lower in the ranking list compared 
with Hanoi (ranked 4th with a population of 7.5 million). Thanh Hoa’s (Thua Thien Hue’s)12 
nighttime light intensity are ranked 26th (41th) and are approximately 0.35 (0.26) times that of 
Hanoi. The territory gradually expanded southward at different speeds13, which was also 
exogenous to the residents of any time. We considered the history of Vietnamese territory 
expansion when constructing the IV. We set the highest cost for the district to be located in the 
“future territory” as of the year of the imperial examination. Specifically, we let the distance 
be 2,272 km14 in a given “future territory” district for the imperial examination year.  
Third, the coefficients of .2!*.6!	+#,$.&/! to the imperial examination test venue 
were negative and were statistically significant in explaining the number and density of 
imperial elites by district, regardless of the fixed effects at the province level (see columns (1)–
(8) in Table 1) and controls at the district level.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Where provincial fixed effects were present, the coefficients showed the difference in the cost 
of travelling to the imperial examination venues among districts within a given province.  
This contrasts with the correlations between the IV and the density of present-day 
primary schools, secondary schools, high schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, and health 
stations (more precisely, the numbers per 2009 district population)15.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As per Table 2, the average distance to imperial examination venues had no correlation with 
the variables for present-day density of educational employees, secondary schools, high 
schools, colleges, hospitals, and clinics when provincial fixed effects were in present. This 
suggests that the average distance cannot explain the within-province differences. 
Contemporary density of general schools by contemporary population was least likely 
determined by the average distance to the imperial examination test venues. This also suggests 
that if the average distance has causal effects on contemporary educational achievements, the 
 
11 We used nighttime light data for 2009 from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for this 
comparison. 
12 In 2009, they also had respective populations of only 3.4 and 1 million compared with today’s 86 million. 
13 See Dell et al. (2018) for some of specific historical events related to the territorial expansion. 
14 The distance of 2,272 km is how far an individual has to travel on foot from Mong Cai (the farthest point in 
northeastern Vietnam) to Ca Mau (the farthest point in southeastern Vietnam) today. We also tried other values 
separately for robustness checks. 
15 These variables were from the 2007 Establishment Census by the GSO. We did the same between the IV and 
number of contemporary employees in the education and health care sectors.  
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channel should be via factors other than the contemporary density of local school (and health) 
endowments. In addition, although contemporary institutions may have helped districts with a 
higher density of schools (Acemoglu et al., 2014), this was least likely to be related to imperial 
elites.  
In addition, the IV also aligned with suggestions from Angrist and Krueger (2001). The 
IV had no relationship with the abilities of imperial elites that might have been transferred to 
following generations via kinship. In the intended estimations with educational outcomes, the 
abilities of subsequent generations potentially remain in the error terms. 
3.2 Methods 
We first estimated the aforementioned variables in an ordinary least squares model 
using the reduced form equation for each unit as a district: 
(1) >'$/0(! = @!. &!"#$! + @". /0&$*0" + C, 
where &!"#$! is the number of imperial elites who claim the district as home. We also used the 
density of imperial elites per square kilometer in the present-day district area as an alternative. 
In addition to the control variables mentioned in Section 2.3, the ratio of the Kinh ethnic group 
(D#&ℎ	*.$!) in the present-day district population16 was added to form the /0&$*0". We also 
considered a probability weight for each district, formed by dividing the 2009 district 
population by the national population. 
We converted (1) into (3) below using the IV, two-stage least squares, and generalized 
method of moments estimation with robust standard errors. Specifically, in the first stage, we 
estimated 
(2) &!"#$!, = E!. .2!*.6!	+#,$.&/! + E". F + G. 
In the second stage, we estimated a model similar to (1) as 
(3) >'$/0(! = H!. &!"I$!J + H". F + K, 
where F is the set of control variables. F in Equations (2) and (3) used the same controls as in 
Equation (1). In addition, we also used Equations (2) and (3) for estimating the other outcomes, 
such as the probability of attending school among those born in 1991, and the probability of 
 
16 We also had a specification without any control variables, as shown in Online Appendices 1, 3, 6, and 8. 
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taking the 2009 NEEU among those born in 1991 and also having completed the twelfth grade 
by 2009. 
 Using the same procedure as in (2) and (3) but at the individual level, we regressed the 
z-scores of the 2009 NEEU test takers on the number of imperial elites in the corresponding 
districts. In addition, F also included a gender dummy and a dummy indicating whether or not 
the individual was ineligible for some contemporary educational policy privileges (1 if 
ineligible, and 0 otherwise). Those eligible for educational policy privileges were children of 
soldiers wounded or killed in combat and other national heroes (according to Vietnamese 
government regulations).  
We report estimations where the number of imperial elites according to district was 
available as the main results. We used the density of imperial elites as an alternative (see Online 
Appendix 2, 3, 5 and 6). 
4. Results 
4.1 Persistent effects on present-day quantity of educational attainment 
In general, we found that the number of imperial elites in a given district was associated 
with a higher present-day quantity of educational attainment, as shown in Table 3. The results 
are robust even when we used density of imperial elites, as shown in Online Appendices 2 and 
3. An additional imperial elite was associated with a 0.2% increase in the literacy rate of the 
district (see column (11) of Table 3), and translated to an additional 0.12 years of schooling 
among those aged 22+ and 25+, as evidenced in columns (13)–(14) of Table 3.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2 Persistent effects on present-day effort to prolong years of schooling 
We found that the number of imperial elites in a given district had a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with higher school attendance rate in 2009, but a lower 
number of school dropouts and non-enrollment, as shown in columns (15)–(17). It should be 
noted that these are the rates for compulsory education. Thus, the results suggested that the 
presence of imperial elites was associated with greater focus and effort on the first stage of 
present-day education. In addition, primary school attendance is compulsory and free in 
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Vietnam; therefore, the dropout and non-enrollment rates are considered pure because they 
were unlikely to be distorted by the cost of learning. 
 Furthermore, the school attendance rate was higher among those born in 1991 and those 
aged 18–24 years in association with !"#$!	&'()!*, as shown in columns (18)–(19). This 
indicates that those residing in the imperial elites’ home districts had a higher tendency to 
pursue more years of schooling, to post-high school education.  
4.3 Persistent effects on present-day quality of education 
We found that the z-scores of the 2009 NEEU test takers were associated with the 
number of imperial elites who shared the same home district. An additional imperial elite in 
the district leads to an increase of up to 0.02 standard deviation on test scores, as shown in 
Table 4. The results are consistent regardless of classification, test length, and for all subjects 
except for Biology (statistically insignificant).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In addition, results using Mathematics best reflected the persistent legacy on quality of 
education and human capital. Mathematics was a compulsory subject for all grades. Nearly all 
(98%) of the test takers had to take the Mathematics test as part of the NEEU (Vu, 2019). As 
mentioned earlier, the z-score is considered to reflect the best effort of each test taker because 
the threshold for selecting students for university placement was exogenous to everyone. 
4.4 Robustness checks 
First, we conducted all estimations using the density of imperial elites per square 
kilometer as the main explanatory variable and found that the main results were consistent (see 
Online Appendices 2, 3, 5 and 6). 
Second, we re-ran the estimations without using district GIS control variables. The 
corresponding results shown in Online Appendices 1, 3, 6, and 8 were similar to those of the 
original estimations. Of the 26 outcomes, there were only three exceptions: the rate of taking 
the NEEU in 2009, Foreign Language test scores (statistically insignificant), and Biology test 
scores (statistically insignificant and negative). These exceptions did not change our main 
interpretation because the results using the sum of the test scores were consistent across all 
estimations.  
Third, we replicated all estimations using the two additional values for maximum 
distance applied to the abovementioned “future territory”. In these replications, we replaced 
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2,272 km, which was used in our main reported estimations, with 3,000 or 4,000 km. Our 
replication results, shown in Online Appendices 9–11, were consistent with the main results. 
Fourth, we considered spatial autocorrelation, as suggested by Kelly (2019). Districts 
might be clustered according to geography rather than administrative boundaries. We applied 
the procedures by Colella et al. (2019)17 and tried different assumptions for the distance beyond 
the observations belonging to the same cluster, including 25, 50, 100, 200, and 300 km. We 
repeated this with the specifications outlined in Table 3, and, once again, using the density of 
imperial elites. The standard errors changed slightly; however, the results of the new 
estimations were consistent with the main results for the IV second stage shown in Table 3 
(except for the case mentioned in the previous section).  
4.5 Possible channels and reasons for persistent historical legacy 
The Vietnamese of today have little incentive to study past knowledge on 
Confucianism. Imperial examinations and Chinese characters are no longer part of Vietnamese 
life. To our knowledge, none of the content from Confucian textbooks has been transferred to 
today’s textbooks or influenced today’s university entrance examinations or technologies. 
Therefore, even the forced transfer of Confucian content and knowledge via social interaction 
would confer no educational advantages on those living in imperial elites’ districts today. 
Instead, the culture of learning and determination would persist and likely be 
transferred via informal institutions. This is because present-day formal institutions are based 
on the communist ideology. Vietnamese imperial institutions were abolished in 1945. 
Meanwhile, the culture of learning and determination was transferred at the local (i.e., village) 
level via informal institutions for centuries. Nguyen (2005) examined the village institution via 
records kept in the village’s common house (Đình làng in Vietnamese). Nguyen (2005) noted 
that villagers donated land for the building of schools in 1767. They even had public rice fields 
dedicated for educational purposes. The money earned from renting out the rice fields would 
be spent on private schools for everyone in the village. The money was also used to hire good 
teachers and pay them bonuses. Villagers also designated person to manage the village library. 
Villagers bought books (for learning and exam preparation) and shared them with learners. 
Nguyen (2005) found village rules stating that the person in charge of education was required 
to place Confucian books in direct sunlight on sunny days to help prolong the lives of the 
books. Nguyen (2005) also found records of a village program encouraging villagers to learn, 
 
17 Specifically, we used Stata command “acreg” (Colella et al., 2019), which supports the IV approach as well. 
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giving learners an exemption from forced labor such as public service and offering a bonus 
when learners passed their examinations. The program also encouraged learners to attain the 
highest rank in the national level of the imperial examinations. The names of those who 
succeeded would be carved in the stelae or documented in records kept in the village common 
house. This is still considered a source of family pride today, maintained from generation to 
generation.  
Formal institutions allowed village culture and its regulations to prosper, especially 
because administrative control at the village level has always been free from central 
government control (Dell et al., 2018). Present-day government rules (see Government Decree 
No 92/2009/ND-CP dated November 2009) allow only a few administrative positions at the 
commune level to receive a salary from the government budget. Moreover, the mandated 
Government Decree No 34/2019/ND-CP dated April 2019, for the first time, recognized fewer 
than three positions at the village level, listed them as non-specialized positions, and let them 
be eligible for a modest subsidy from the government budget. This suggests that village 
officials are elected mainly based on the will of local voters and the available funding. 
There are several potential economic reasons that could explain persistent legacies. 
First, academic degrees, especially those from institutions of higher learning, play an important 
role in the wage scale (Vu and Yamada, 2018, 2020). Therefore, pursuing more years of 
schooling should lead to a higher income, and consequently lift an individual out of poverty. 
Meanwhile, entrance examinations to university are competitive. Demand far exceeds the 
number of available seats at universities and only 4%–50% of entrance examination test takers 
are admitted to universities (Vu, 2019). Tuition fees at universities are heavily subsidized by 
the government because the majority of universities are public institutions. Second, home 
favoritism is common among public officials (Do et al., 2017) and top-ranked politicians (Vu 
and Yamada, 2017). Once individuals had reached these high positions, they would divert 
resources to their hometown districts.  
Kinship and family ties are also important (Wantchekon et al., 2013) and provide a 
straightforward channel for the legacy. Naturally, some imperial elites were related. 
Unfortunately, we were not able to further investigate the kinship channel in the manner of 
Chen et al. (2020) with respect to the Chinese imperial examination system. Further 
complicating the issue is how common some Vietnamese family names are. For example, the 
family name Nguyen accounted for nearly a third of both imperial elites and 2009 NEEU test 
takers. In addition, a given family name written in the Vietnamese alphabet today might be 
associated with several different names in the past written with Chinese characters that had the 
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same pronunciation. Finally, Vietnamese middle names and the lack of consistency in naming 
rules made all our attempts at identifying kinship futile.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examined the relationship between the number (or density) of imperial 
elites and the quantity and quality of present-day education in Vietnam. We found that the 
association is positively statistically significant for educational variables such as average years 
of schooling (among those aged 18+, 22+, and 25+ years), literacy rate (among those aged ≥7 
years), and school attendance rate at the district level. NEEU test scores were positively 
proportional to the number and density of imperial elites. The results were obtained using the 
novel IV, the average distance from each district to the former capital where the imperial 
examinations were held.  
This study had several limitations. First, the data we collected on imperial elites do not 
include every imperial elite that ever existed in Vietnamese history. Some names are missing 
because records were destroyed, ruined, or lost. The names and homes of imperial elites in the 
dataset were taken from available and up-to-date documents. Therefore, our results might be 
subject to bias. Second, assuming a linear travel time cost according to distance, our 
constructed average distance for IV includes measurement errors. Third, the present-day 
district boundaries might not be identical to those in the past. Similarly, the culture of learning 
would be rooted at the village level rather than the district level. Therefore, if information were 
to be identified at the village level, the effects may be even higher than those estimated. Fourth, 
we had little confidence asserting a difference in the rate of t NEEU test-taking between those 
living in the imperial elites’ home districts and those living in other districts. This is because 
we found that the results for this specific outcome were not consistent or significant across 
specifications and spatial correlation specifics. Fifth, we did not have the information necessary 
to account for internal migration among imperial elites, although we acknowledged the 
movement among present-day Vietnamese, which was accounted for 6.6% of the 15% 
population sample in 2009. Sixth, we did not have sufficiently detailed data about several 
historical events that occurred between 1919 and 2009. For example, we lacked detailed 
information on the land reforms implemented between 1953 and 1956 in North Vietnam. 
Therefore, we were unable to test whether the culture of learning would have been interrupted 
accordingly, as examined in China by Chen et al. (2020) and by Meng and Grogory (2002). 
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Similarly, we were unable to consider the re-unification event in 1975 and reforms specific to 
South Vietnam in our analysis. In addition, we did not consider whether the impact of French 
colonization might have altered the estimated results, as previous literature (Michalopoulos 
and Papaioannou, 2020) on Africa did. Given these limitations, we speculate that the legacy of 
imperial examinations may have been even more profound than our estimates suggest. 
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Appendix 1 Brief description of 1075–1919 imperial examinations in Vietnam 
Vietnamese emperors used imperial examinations to select state bureaucrats from 
among the citizenry starting in 1075 (in the Ly Dynasty). Inspired by the Chinese imperial 
examination system, the Vietnamese examinations were initially based on the teachings (Tam 
giáo in Vietnamese) of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism but from 1232 focused solely 
on Confucianism and its literature (Ngo, 2006). From 1396, the imperial examinations were 
split into two tiers (Ngo, 2006), the provincial level (thi Hương in Vietnamese) and the national 
level (thi Hội in Vietnamese). Only those who passed the provincial examination were eligible 
to take the national examination. During the Ho Dynasty (1400–1407), they were even asked 
to visit the capital to study for the national examination for almost a year (Ngo, 2006). 
We counted only those who passed the national level examination. The selection rate 
for the national examination was as low as 1% of all test takers in 1463 (Ngo, 2006). The 
national level had one or two rounds of tests, depending on the dynasty. The first level was a 
written test and the second, which was probably only offered to those with the highest scores 
on the written test, was an oral examination (thi Đình in Vietnamese)18.  
Ngo (2006) reported that the national examinations were evaluated blindly. For 
example, in 1442, the original answer sheets were hand-copied, sealed, and stored carefully. 
Two independent evaluators anonymously evaluated the examinations according to their copy 
of the answer sheet and submitted the scores to the Chief Examinations Executive, who created 
a short list of those who passed and those who would be interviewed by the emperor. With this 
assistance of his bureaucrats, the emperor would directly interview the shortlisted candidates 
and select the top ones (the winners). 
The number of winners and runners-up as well as the awarded title names varied over 
time. From 1247, the highest ranked test taker was deemed the principal graduate (Trạng 
Nguyên in Vietnamese, or 狀元 in Chinese). The special treatment offered by the emperor to 
the winners and runners-up from 1442 included an emperor banquet, clothes, servants, horses, 
and permission to perform a special ritual (vinh quy bái tổ in Vietnamese) to report their success 
to their ancestors in their hometown. In addition, the highest-scoring winners’ names were 
carved in a stone stela and stored in the national culture temples, while the names of all those 
who passed the national level examinations (written form) (including the winners) were 
recorded in a book entitled List of Imperial Elites (Đăng Khoa Lục in Vietnamese).  
 
18 However, sometimes the interviews were not conducted (Ngo, 2006). Those who passed the written form were 
treated as imperial elites in our analysis. 
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Appendix 2 Test venues, timelines, and number of recorded imperial elites 
 
Year of exams 
  
Dynasty Test venue Raw data 
  Province District Times Elites  
1075-1225 Ly  Hanoi Ba Dinh 4 11 
1232-1393 Tran  Hanoi Ba Dinh 16 49 
1400-1405 Ho Thanh Hoa Vinh Loc 3 11 
1426-1526 Le Hanoi Ba Dinh 32 1,008 
1529-1592 Mac Hanoi Ba Dinh 22 482 
1554-1595 Le Thanh Hoa Tho Xuan 8 51 
1598-1787 Le Hanoi Ba Dinh 64 723 
1822-1919 Nguyen Thua Thien Hue Hue 39 553 
Sum       188 2,888 
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Appendix 3 Descriptive statistics of district data 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of elites (Elite number) 4.1325 11.2106 0 98 
Density of elites (Elite density) 0.0547 0.3444 0 7.7807 
The IV - !"#$%&#	()*+%,-# to 
imperial test venue (km) 999.9595 845.5751 23.0431 2127.5340 
District population 126,227 87,751 83 701,194 
District area (km2) 435.0914 403.3787 1.542285 2678.948 
Urban land rate 0.0228 0.1147 0 1 
Cropland rate 0.4698 0.3166 0 1 
Elevation mean (m) 216.2590 309.7120 1 1544.59 
Distance to coastal line (km)* 86.11 84.77 0.23 434.57 
Nightlight intensity 8.3877 14.1880 0 63 
Literate rate 0.9202 0.0894 0.4717 1 
Kinh ethnic rate 0.6724 0.2968 0.0156 0.9114 
Years of schooling     
    18+ 9.0020 1.4968 6.1028 17.5763 
    22+ 7.6128 1.2696 5.3661 13.4042 
    25+ 7.4610 1.2767 5.1565 13.1569 
Attending school rate     
    1991-born* 0.5491 0.1760 0.1429 0.9182 
    18-24 0.1675 0.1349 0.0451 0.7476 
Compulsory education 
among aged 7-10* 
    
   Attending rate 0.9627 0.0442 0.6077 1 
   Dropout rate 0.0153 0.0123 0 0.0692 
   Never-enroll rate 0.0218 0.0360 0 0.3758 
NEEU taking rate **  0.4482 0.1451 0 1 
 
Notes:  
Number of districts = 687 
* Number of districts = 686 (1 island district did not have any eligible individuals) 
** Number of districts = 681; the rate was among those born in 1991 who finished the twelfth grade
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Appendix 4 Descriptive statistics of 2009 NEEU test scores  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
     
A classification 
N= 340,855 
    
Z-score     
   Sum 0.0003 1.0001 –1.3259 2.8196 
   Physics 0.0003 1.0001 –1.7885 4.2505 
   Mathematics 0.0002 1.0001 –3.3757 2.6521 
   Chemistry 0.0003 1.0002 –2.6303 4.6248 
Sex (=1, if female) 0.5246 0.4994 0 1 
No privilege 0.8998 0.3003 0 1      
B classification 
N=178,704 
    
Z–score     
   Sum 0.0004 1.0001 –1.4543 2.7257 
   Biology 0.0001 1.0000 –3.2974 4.0949 
   Mathematics 0.0004 1.0002 –1.5672 3.1413 
   Chemistry 0.0004 1.0002 –2.8163 3.9163 
Sex (=1, if female) 0.5377 0.4986 0 1 
No privilege 0.9025 0.2966 0 1      
C classification 
N=50,721 
    
Z-score     
   Sum 0.0003 1.0000 –1.6403 2.9178 
   Literature 0.0012 0.9996 –3.4451 3.0550 
   History –0.0005 1.0000 –1.4652 3.6285 
   Geography 0.0002 0.9998 –3.4745 2.9814 
Sex (=1, if female) 0.8166 0.3870 0 1 
No privilege 0.8532 0.3540 0 1      
D classification 
N=111,029 
    
Z–score     
    Sum 0.0004 1.0000 –1.3448 3.2335 
    Literature 0.0004 1.0000 –3.6740 3.4757 
    Mathematics 0.0004 1.0001 –1.4702 3.2093 
    Foreign language 0.0001 1.0001 –2.4647 4.2135 
Sex (=1, if female) 0.8083 0.3937 0 1 
No privilege 0.9447 0.2285 0 1 
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Appendix 5 Number of imperial elites and approximate in-land territory expansion timelines 
 
Note:  
The map shape corresponds with the 2015 division. Therefore, “missing” cells indicate newly established 
districts rather than missing data in 2009. Timelines are approximations based on Tran (1919) used for the 
calculation of the IV only. We do not claim any historical evidence. 
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Online Appendix 1 Effects on present-day educational achievements (no other district controls) 
 
Variables Literate rate Years of schooling Attendance 
rate 
Dropout rate Never-enroll 
rate 
Attendance rate Taking 
NEEU after 
12th grade 
Age cohort 7+ 18+ 22+ 25+ 7-10 7-10 7-10 1991-born 18-24 1991-born 
 
          
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
     
           
Elite number 0.0011*** 0.0408*** 0.0340*** 0.0335*** 0.0007*** –0.0003*** –0.0004*** 0.0056*** 0.0020** 0.0007  
(0.0001) (0.0092) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0007) 
R-squared 0.047 0.086 0.095 0.094 0.082 0.136 0.042 0.175 0.028 0.006  
          
IV 2nd stage (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)  
                
 
 
Elite number 0.0015*** 0.1074*** 0.0964*** 0.0967*** 0.0020*** –0.0012*** –0.0008*** 0.0167*** 0.0043*** –0.0000  
(0.0003) (0.0166) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0009) 
F-statistics† 94.45 94.45 94.45 94.45 94.45 94.45 94.45 94.45 94.45 94.46 
           
N districts 687 687 687 687 686 686 686 686 687 681 
Notes: 
† Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for testing H0: Weak identification test. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). P-weight was in all estimations. 
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Online Appendix 2 Effects on present-day educational achievements (using elite density)  
 
Variables Literate rate Years of schooling Attendance 
rate 
Dropout rate Never-enroll 
rate 
Attendance rate Taking 
NEEU after 
12th grade 
Age cohort 7+ 18+ 22+ 25+ 7-10 7-10 7-10 1991-born 18-24 1991-born 
 
          
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
     
           
Elite density 0.0058* 0.8425 0.6819* 0.6772* 0.0086* –0.0060* –0.0027* 0.0797 0.0523 0.0262***  
(0.0033) (0.5618) (0.3891) (0.3799) (0.0047) (0.0032) (0.0016) (0.0502) (0.0418) (0.0074) 
R-squared 0.562 0.575 0.560 0.550 0.304 0.180 0.364 0.251 0.488 0.466  
          
IV 2nd stage (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)  
                  
Elite density 0.1450*** 8.7584*** 7.7896*** 7.8107*** 0.1505*** –0.0858*** –0.0661*** 1.2195*** 0.4296*** 0.1186**  
(0.0326) (1.7258) (1.5520) (1.5596) (0.0319) (0.0178) (0.0147) (0.2513) (0.0942) (0.0515) 
F-statistics† 23.83 23.83 23.83 23.83 23.83 23.83 23.83 23.83 23.83 23.72 
           
N districts 687 687 687 687 686 686 686 686 687 681 
 
Note: Same as Table 3.
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Online Appendix 3 Effects on present-day educational achievements (using elite density but no other controls)  
 
Variables Literate rate Years of schooling Attendance 
rate 
Dropout rate Never-enroll 
rate 
Attendance rate Taking 
NEEU after 
12th grade 
Age cohort 7+ 18+ 22+ 25+ 7-10 7-10 7-10 1991-born 18-24 1991-born 
 
          
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
               
Elite density 0.0218** 1.6459** 1.3390** 1.3238** 0.0119** –0.0056** –0.0064** 0.1172** 0.1254** 0.0451***  
(0.0099) (0.8230) (0.5862) (0.5723) (0.0055) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0557) (0.0627) (0.0134) 
R-squared 0.018 0.132 0.140 0.138 0.020 0.032 0.010 0.071 0.098 0.020  
          
IV 2nd stage (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)  
                  
Elite density 0.1028*** 7.2051*** 6.4672*** 6.4872*** 0.1343*** –0.0825*** –0.0532*** 1.1197*** 0.2885*** –0.0015  
(0.0282) (1.4922) (1.3222) (1.3286) (0.0306) (0.0186) (0.0132) (0.2416) (0.0865) (0.0609) 
F-statistics† 20.31 20.31 20.31 20.31 20.31 20.31 20.31 20.31 20.31 20.31 
           
N districts 687 687 687 687 686 686 686 686 687 681 
 
Note: Same as Table 3. 
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Online Appendix 4 Effects on present-day educational achievements using elite number and accounting for spatial correlations 
 
Variables Literate rate Years of schooling Attendance 
rate 
Dropout rate Never-enroll 
rate 
Attendance rate Taking 
NEEU after 
12th grade 
Age cohort 7+ 18+ 22+ 25+ 7-10 7-10 7-10 1991-born 18-24 1991-born 
Cutoff = 25km           
Elite number 0.0023*** 0.1399*** 0.1244*** 0.1247*** 0.0024*** –0.0014*** –0.0011*** 0.0195*** 0.0069*** 0.0019*  
(0.0004) (0.0162) (0.0147) (0.0149) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0024) (0.0013) (0.0010) 
Cutoff = 50km           
Elite number 0.0023*** 0.1399*** 0.1244*** 0.1247*** 0.0024*** –0.0014*** –0.0011*** 0.0195*** 0.0069*** 0.0019  
(0.0006) (0.0218) (0.0204) (0.0208) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0033) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Cutoff = 100km           
Elite number 0.0023*** 0.1399*** 0.1244*** 0.1247*** 0.0024*** –0.0014*** –0.0011*** 0.0195*** 0.0069*** 0.0019  
(0.0006) (0.0234) (0.0217) (0.0220) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0033) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Cutoff = 200km           
Elite number 0.0023*** 0.1399*** 0.1244*** 0.1247*** 0.0024*** –0.0014*** –0.0011*** 0.0195*** 0.0069*** 0.0019  
(0.0005) (0.0172) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0016) 
Cutoff = 300km           
Elite number 0.0069*** 0.0023*** 0.1399*** 0.1244*** 0.1247*** –0.0014*** –0.0011*** 0.0195*** 0.0069*** 0.0019  
(0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0147) (0.0130) (0.0133) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0015) 
N districts 687 687 687 687 686 686 686 686 687 681 
 
Note: 
All estimations included the Kinh ethnic rate, nighttime light intensity, population density in 2009, urban land ratio, and cropland ratio in 1992, mean elevation in 1996, and 
distance to the coastline as controls, and used p-weight. 
Colella et al. (2019) specifies cutoff as the lower-limit distance. If two districts were located farther than the lower limit, the correlation between error terms of the two is 
assumed to be zero. We used the “bartlett” option in the Stata command “acreg” (see Colella et al., 2019 for an explanation).
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Online Appendix 5 Effects on present-day educational achievements using elite density and accounting for spatial correlations 
 
Variables Literate rate Years of schooling Attendance 
rate 
Dropout rate Never-enroll 
rate 
Attendance rate Taking 
NEEU after 
12th grade 
Age cohort 7+ 18+ 22+ 25+ 7-10 7-10 7-10 1991-born 18-24 1991-born 
Cutoff = 25km           
Elite density 0.1450** 8.7584*** 7.7896*** 7.8107*** 0.1505** –0.0858** –0.0661** 1.2195*** 0.4296*** 0.1186 
 (0.0620) (2.9796) (2.7801) (2.8099) (0.0609) (0.0336) (0.0280) (0.4634) (0.1203) (0.0770) 
Cutoff = 50km           
Elite density 0.1450** 8.7584*** 7.7896** 7.8107** 0.1505** –0.0858** –0.0661** 1.2195** 0.4296*** 0.1186 
 (0.0692) (3.2578) (3.0549) (3.0926) (0.0664) (0.0366) (0.0307) (0.4961) (0.1266) (0.1011) 
Cutoff = 100km           
Elite density 0.1450** 8.7584*** 7.7896*** 7.8107*** 0.1505** –0.0858** –0.0661** 1.2195*** 0.4296*** 0.1186 
 (0.0679) (3.1351) (2.9320) (2.9670) (0.0647) (0.0354) (0.0304) (0.4649) (0.1213) (0.1145) 
Cutoff = 200km           
Elite density 0.1450*** 8.7584*** 7.7896*** 7.8107*** 0.1505*** –0.0858*** –0.0661** 1.2195*** 0.4296*** 0.1186 
 (0.0558) (2.6780) (2.4415) (2.4647) (0.0554) (0.0298) (0.0267) (0.3779) (0.1073) (0.1111) 
Cutoff = 300km           
Elite density 0.1450*** 8.7584*** 7.7896*** 7.8107*** 0.1505*** –0.0858*** –0.0661*** 1.2195*** 0.4296*** 0.1186 
 (0.0490) (2.3825) (2.1478) (2.1663) (0.0487) (0.0260) (0.0236) (0.3328) (0.1030) (0.1010) 
           
N districts 687 687 687 687 686 686 686 686 687 681 
 
Note: 
Same as Online Appendix 4.
  30 
Online Appendix 6 Effects on 2009 NEEU z-scores (without other district controls) 
Classification A 
   
B 
   
Variables Sum Physics Mathematics Chemistry Sum Biology Mathematics Chemistry 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Elite number 0.0063*** 0.0073*** 0.0039*** 0.0055*** 0.0081*** 0.0012** 0.0101*** 0.0069*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0009) 
R-squared 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.024 0.009 0.030 0.015 
         
IV 2nd stage (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
         
Elite number 0.0167*** 0.0200*** 0.0088*** 0.0151*** 0.0188*** -0.0022* 0.0262*** 0.0157*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0020) 
F–statistics† 135.79 135.79 135.79 135.79 132.47 132.47 132.47 132.47 
         
N test takers 340,855 340,855 340,855 340,855 178,704 178,704 178,704 178,704 
         
Classification C    D    
Variables Sum Literature History Geography Sum Literature Mathematics 
Foreign 
language 
OLS (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Elite number 0.0062*** 0.0100*** 0.0031*** 0.0026*** 0.0058*** 0.0118*** 0.0039*** –0.0013 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
R-squared 0.024 0.063 0.009 0.014 0.007 0.074 0.014 0.004 
         
IV 2nd stage (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
Elite number 0.0222*** 0.0406*** 0.0086*** 0.0079*** 0.0248*** 0.0412*** 0.0176*** 0.0009 
 (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0036) 
F-statistics† 133.29 133.29 133.29 133.29 106.03 106.03 106.03 106.03 
         
N test takers 50,721 50,721 50,721 50,721 111,029 111,029 111,029 111,029 
         
 
Notes: 
† Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for testing H0: Weak identification test. 
Robust district-clustered standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
All estimations included !"# and $%	'()*)+"," as controls.
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Online Appendix 7 Effects on 2009 NEEU z-scores (using elite density) 
Classification A 
   
B 
   
Variables Sum Physics Mathematics Chemistry Sum Biology Mathematics Chemistry 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Elite density 0.0570 0.0733* 0.0215 0.0557 0.1162* –0.0159* 0.1498* 0.1166* 
 (0.0358) (0.0401) (0.0185) (0.0365) (0.0678) (0.0090) (0.0812) (0.0658) 
R-squared 0.040 0.037 0.035 0.023 0.064 0.024 0.065 0.050 
         
IV 2nd stage (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Elite density 1.0337*** 1.1692*** 0.5851*** 0.9668*** 1.8171*** –0.1139 2.4069*** 1.6247*** 
 (0.3129) (0.3510) (0.1848) (0.2927) (0.3980) (0.0846) (0.5229) (0.3562) 
F–statistics† 11.35 11.35 11.35 11.35 21.99 21.99 21.99 21.99 
         
N test takers 340,855 340,855 340,855 340,855 178,704 178,704 178,704 178,704 
         
Classification C    D    
Variables Sum Literature History Geography Sum Literature Mathematics 
Foreign 
language 
OLS (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Elite density 0.1171*** 0.2175*** 0.0460** 0.0384 0.0798** 0.1155*** 0.0597* 0.0132* 
 (0.0380) (0.0811) (0.0203) (0.0264) (0.0353) (0.0442) (0.0313) (0.0075) 
R-squared 0.038 0.090 0.019 0.020 0.079 0.092 0.060 0.084 
         
IV 2nd stage (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
Elite density 2.1209*** 4.1008*** 0.4318** 1.0493*** 0.8585*** 1.2571*** 0.6565*** 0.1086** 
 (0.3869) (0.6890) (0.2046) (0.2600) (0.3132) (0.4584) (0.2427) (0.0543) 
F-statistics† 37.37 37.37 37.37 37.37 7.39 7.39 7.39 7.39 
         
N test takers 50,721 50,721 50,721 50,721 111,029 111,029 111,029 111,029 
         
 
 
Note: 
Same as Table 4. 
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Online Appendix 8 Effects on 2009 NEEU z-scores (using elite density but no other 
controls) 
Classification A 
   
B 
   
Variables Sum Physics Mathematics Chemistry Sum Biology Mathematics Chemistry 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Elite density 0.1339** 0.1579** 0.0886** 0.1020* 0.2738** 0.0829** 0.3049** 0.2477** 
 (0.0658) (0.0725) (0.0440) (0.0558) (0.1256) (0.0356) (0.1418) (0.1137) 
R-squared 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.020 0.009 0.020 0.013 
         
IV 2nd stage (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Elite density 1.0155*** 1.2160*** 0.5329*** 0.9189*** 1.7468*** –0.2080* 2.4382*** 1.4623*** 
 (0.2743) (0.3236) (0.1567) (0.2499) (0.3125) (0.1182) (0.4228) (0.2659) 
F–statistics† 13.21 13.21 13.21 13.21 34.09 34.09 34.09 34.09 
         
N test takers 340,855 340,855 340,855 340,855 178,704 178,704 178,704 178,704 
         
Classification C    D    
Variables Sum Literature History Geography Sum Literature Mathematics 
Foreign 
language 
OLS (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Elite density 0.2142** 0.3827** 0.1225*** 0.0364 0.1773*** 0.1608** 0.1311** 0.1166*** 
 (0.0872) (0.1609) (0.0396) (0.0322) (0.0680) (0.0640) (0.0544) (0.0377) 
R-squared 0.020 0.055 0.009 0.012 0.022 0.067 0.023 0.013 
         
IV 2nd stage (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
Elite density 2.3319*** 4.2721*** 0.9066*** 0.8315*** 0.7794*** 1.2921*** 0.5535*** 0.0272 
 (0.3561) (0.6052) (0.2120) (0.1992) (0.2807) (0.4886) (0.2021) (0.1082) 
F-statistics† 49.86 49.86 49.86 49.86 6.47 6.47 6.47 6.47 
         
N test takers 50,721 50,721 50,721 50,721 111,029 111,029 111,029 111,029 
         
 
Note: 
Same as Online Appendix 6.
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Online Appendix 9 Replicated main estimations in Table 1 with different values of 
maximum (max) distance to construct the IV  
 
Elite Number Number Number Number Density Density Density Density 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Max=3000km         
Average 
distance 
–0.0057*** –0.0591** –0.0057*** –0.0526** –0.0001*** –0.0030*** –0.0001*** –0.0021*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0255) (0.0005) (0.0229) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0006) 
R-squared 0.233 0.584 0.364 0.620 0.054 0.242 0.201 0.365 
         
Max=4000km         
Average 
distance 
–0.0043*** –0.0591** –0.0043*** –0.0526** –0.0001*** –0.0030*** –0.0001*** –0.0021*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0255) (0.0004) (0.0230) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0006) 
R-squared 0.228 0.584 0.360 0.621 0.052 0.242 0.199 0.365 
         
Province FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N districts 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 
 
Note: 
Same as Table 1.
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Online Appendix 10 Replicated main IV 2nd stage estimations in Table 3 with different values of maximum (max) distance to construct the IV 
 
Variables Literate rate Years of schooling Attendance 
rate 
Dropout rate Never-enroll 
rate 
Attendance rate Taking 
NEEU after 
12th grade 
Age cohort 7+ 18+ 22+ 25+ 7-10 7-10 7-10 1991-born 18-24 1991-born 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
A. Max=3000km           
     
           
Elite number 0.0023*** 0.1407*** 0.1248*** 0.1251*** 0.0024*** –0.0014*** –0.0010*** 0.0196*** 0.0070*** 0.0019**  
(0.0003) (0.0134) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
N districts 687 687 687 687 686 686 686 686 687 681 
F-statistics† 118.07 118.07 118.07 118.07 118.07 118.07 118.07 118.07 118.07 117.74  
          
B. Max=4000km           
 
                
 
 
Elite number 0.0022*** 0.1411*** 0.1250*** 0.1252*** 0.0024*** –0.0014*** –0.0010*** 0.0197*** 0.0071*** 0.0018**  
(0.0003) (0.0134) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
N districts 687 687 687 687 686 686 686 686 687 681 
F-statistics† 117.74 117.74 117.74 117.74 117.73 117.73 117.73 117.73 117.74 117.34 
 
Notes: 
Same as Table 3. 
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Online Appendix 11 Replicated main IV 2nd stage estimations in Table 4 with different 
values of maximum (max) distance to construct the IV 
 
Classification A 
   
B 
   
Variables Sum Physics Mathematics Chemistry Sum Biology Mathematics Chemistry 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Max=3000km         
Elite number 0.0217*** 0.0245*** 0.0122*** 0.0204*** 0.0236*** –0.0017 0.0313*** 0.0212*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0030) (0.0022) 
F-statistics† 134.05 134.05 134.05 134.05 131.54 131.54 131.54 131.54 
         
Max=4000km         
Elite number 0.0216*** 0.0244*** 0.0121*** 0.0204*** 0.0235*** –0.0019* 0.0312*** 0.0212*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0030) (0.0022) 
F–statistics† 133.89 133.89 133.89 133.89 131.42 131.42 131.42 131.42 
         
N test takers 340,855 340,855 340,855 340,855 178,704 178,704 178,704 178,704 
         
Classification C 
   
D 
   
Variables Sum Literature History Geography Sum Literature Mathematics 
Foreign 
language 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Max=3000km         
Elite number 0.0213*** 0.0409*** 0.0044** 0.0106*** 0.0304*** 0.0443*** 0.0232*** 0.0039** 
 (0.0026) (0.0039) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0028) (0.0015) 
F-statistics† 132.49 132.49 132.49 132.49 109.41 109.41 109.41 109.41 
         
Max=4000km         
Elite number 0.0212*** 0.0407*** 0.0044** 0.0107*** 0.0303*** 0.0443*** 0.0232*** 0.0040** 
 (0.0026) (0.0039) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0028) (0.0015) 
F–statistics† 132.93 132.93 132.93 132.93 109.49 109.49 109.49 109.49 
         
N test takers 50,721 50,721 50,721 50,721 111,029 111,029 111,029 111,029 
         
 
Note: 
Same as Table 4.
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Graph 1 Number of national winners in the imperial examinations by time 
  
Notes: 
§ Ly Dynasty (1009–1225). 
§ Tran Dynasty (1226–1399. 
§ H: Ho Dynasty (1400–1407). 
§ B: Chinese domination (1407–1427). 
§ Le Dyn.: Le Dynasty (1428–1526). 
§ D1: Division 1: Mac Dynasty (1527–1677) with the capital in Ba Dinh, Hanoi until 1592. Le Dynasty 
during division 1 (1533-1789) with the capital in Tho Xuan, Thanh Hoa from 1533 to 1597. 
§ Le Dynasty + D2: Le dynasty (Le Trung Hung) (1533–1789) with division 2. Le dynasty was under the 
control of Trinh lords (1570–1786), with the capital in Ba Dinh, Hanoi. Nguyen Lords (later Nguyen 
Dynasty) (1600–1945) with the capital mainly in Hue. Mac dynasty (1527–1677) with the capital in Cao 
Bang City today from 1593 to 1677. Tay Son dynasty (Nguyen brothers) (1778–1802) had capitals in 
Hue and Binh Dinh today, but no imperial examinations. 
§ Nguyen Dyn.: Nguyen Dynasty (1600–1945) with the capital in Hue. 
§ D3: Division 3. French colony (1858–1945). Nguyen Dynasty (1600-1945) with the capital in Hue. The 
last examinations were conducted in 1919. 
 
H 
 
D1 
 
 
Ly Dynasty Tran Dynasty Le Dynasty + D2 
Nguyen 
Dyn. 
Le Dyn. 
B 
 D3 
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Table 1 Correlations between imperial elites in the district and average distance 
Elite Number Number Number Number Density Density Density Density 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
The IV - !"#$%&#	()*+%,-# to imperial test venues –0.0073*** –0.0591** –0.0074*** –0.0526** –0.0001*** –0.0030*** –0.0001*** –0.0021***  
(0.0008) (0.0255) (0.0007) (0.0229) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0006) 
2009-Kinh rate   14.9688*** 3.8580*   0.2641*** 0.0796 
   (1.8360) (2.1970)   (0.0908) (0.1044) 
2009-Night light intensity   0.0051 –0.0827   –0.0002 0.0044** 
   (0.0398) (0.0567)   (0.0020) (0.0021) 
1992-Urban land ratio   –7.1732 –5.2461   –0.0659 –0.1598 
   (5.0884) (5.0553)   (0.5090) (0.3334) 
1992-Cropland ratio   11.3511*** 10.0949***   0.0935* 0.0110 
   (1.8635) (2.3611)   (0.0477) (0.0981) 
1996-Elevation   0.0071*** –0.0015   0.0001*** 0.0001 
   (0.0020) (0.0015)   (0.0000) (0.0001) 
2009–Population density   0.2633*** 0.1750   0.0194 0.0206** 
   (0.0981) (0.1220)   (0.0128) (0.0101) 
Distance to coastal line   0.0077 –0.0025   0.0005*** 0.0000 
   (0.0071) (0.0172)   (0.0002) (0.0004) 
         
Province FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N districts 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 
R-squared 0.239 0.584 0.368 0.621 0.056 0.242 0.203 0.365 
 
Notes: 
Other controls were the Kinh ethnic rate, nighttime light intensity, population density in 2009, urban land ratio, and cropland ratio in 1992, mean elevation in 1996, and 
distance to the coastline. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
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Table 2 Correlations between density of present-day schools, health facilities, employees, and average distance  
Density Education       Health    
Variables Employees Primary 
school 
Secondary 
school 
High 
school 
Vocational 
school 
College University Employees Hospital Clinic Communal  
health station 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Without province FE 
  
The IV –  
!"#$%&#	()*+%,-# 
to the imperial  
test venues 
–0.0000*** 0.0000 –0.0000*** –0.0000*** –0.0000*** –0.0000*** –0.0000** –0.0000*** –0.0000*** –0.0000** –0.0000*** 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
N districts 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 
R–squared 0.366 0.542 0.613 0.178 0.146 0.150 0.369 0.565 0.136 0.047 0.609 
            
With province FE 
  
The IV –  
!"#$%&#	()*+%,-# 
to the imperial  
test venues 
–0.0000 0.0000 –0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 –0.0000 –0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
N districts 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 687 
R-squared 0.472 0.728 0.684 0.312 0.338 0.354 0.492 0.719 0.266 0.289 0.755 
 
Notes: 
All estimations included the Kinh ethnic rate, nighttime light intensity, population density in 2009, urban land ratio, and cropland ratio in 1992, mean elevation in 1996, and 
distance to the coastline. 
All outcomes were measured in density (per capita in 2009). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). P-weight was in all estimations. 
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Table 3 Effects on present-day educational achievements 
 
Variables Literate rate Years of schooling Attendance 
rate 
Dropout rate Never-enroll 
rate 
Attendance rate Taking 
NEEU after 
12th grade 
Age cohort 7+ 18+ 22+ 25+ 7-10 7-10 7-10 1991-born 18-24 1991-born 
 
          
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
     
           
Elite number 0.0004*** 0.0402*** 0.0326*** 0.0320*** 0.0006*** –0.0002*** –0.0004*** 0.0056*** 0.0017** 0.0002  
(0.0001) (0.0067) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) 
N districts 687 687 687 687 686 686 686 686 687 681 
R-squared 0.567 0.622 0.607 0.595 0.339 0.288 0.373 0.371 0.495 0.460  
          
IV 2nd stage (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
 
                
 
 
Elite number 0.0023*** 0.1399*** 0.1244*** 0.1247*** 0.0024*** –0.0011*** –0.0014*** 0.0195*** 0.0069*** 0.0019**  
(0.0003) (0.0133) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0008) 
N districts 687 687 687 687 686 686 686 686 687 681 
F-statistics† 118.45 118.45 118.45 118.45 118.45 118.45 118.45 118.45 118.45 118.06 
 
Notes: 
† Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for testing H0: Weak identification test. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). P-weight was in all estimations. 
All estimations included the Kinh ethnic ratio, nighttime light intensity, population density in 2009, urban land ratio, and cropland ratio in 1992, mean elevation in 1996, and 
distance to the coastline as controls. 
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Table 4 Effects on 2009 NEEU z-scores  
 
Classification A 
   
B 
   
Variables Sum Physics Mathematics Chemistry Sum Biology Mathematics Chemistry 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Elite number 0.0049*** 0.0053*** 0.0029*** 0.0047*** 0.0057*** 0.0004 0.0071*** 0.0052*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
R-squared 0.043 0.040 0.036 0.026 0.068 0.024 0.070 0.052 
         
IV 2nd stage (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Elite number 0.0217*** 0.0245*** 0.0123*** 0.0203*** 0.0237*** –0.0015 0.0314*** 0.0212*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0030) (0.0022) 
F–statistics† 134.23 134.23 134.23 134.23 131.72 131.72 131.72 131.72 
         
N test takers 340,855 340,855 340,855 340,855 178,704 178,704 178,704 178,704 
         
Classification C    D    
Variables Sum Literature History Geography Sum Literature Mathematics 
Foreign 
language 
OLS (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Elite number 0.0027*** 0.0056*** 0.0002 0.0014 0.0050*** 0.0085*** 0.0039*** –0.0005 
 (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0006) 
R-squared 0.038 0.092 0.019 0.020 0.079 0.096 0.060 0.084 
         
IV 2nd stage (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
Elite number 0.0213*** 0.0411*** 0.0043** 0.0105*** 0.0302*** 0.0443*** 0.0231*** 0.0038** 
 (0.0026) (0.0039) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0027) (0.0015) 
F-statistics† 132.19 132.19 132.19 132.19 109.34 109.34 109.34 109.34 
         
N test takers 50,721 50,721 50,721 50,721 111,029 111,029 111,029 111,029 
         
 
Notes: 
† Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for testing H0: Weak identification test. 
Robust high-school clustered standard errors in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
All estimations included !"#, $%	'()*)+",", the Kinh ethnic ratio, nighttime light intensity, population density 
in 2009, urban land ratio, and cropland ratio in 1992, mean elevation in 1996, and distance to the coastline as 
controls. 
 
 
 
